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Hou and the Taiwanese Experience
Taiwan is a peculiar place resulting in a peculiar cinema, with Hou Hsiao-hsien being its most indelible product. We should be wary of any totalizing terms to 
explain this geopolitical and cinematic oddity. Nevertheless, there is one concept 
which comes close: the “Taiwanese Experience.” The origins of this term are murky, 
but signifi cantly it came into widespread use in the 1980s, and still retains everyday 
cachet on the island today. There are volumes devoted to explaining the term.1  Chen 
Ruxiu’s important study of the Taiwanese New Cinema bears the revealing title: 
Taiwanese New Cinema’s History, Culture and Experience.2 To the uninitiated it 
might seem surprising that the terms “History” and “Culture” are on the same plane 
as “Experience.” In Taiwan, however, the last term trumps them all; in Taiwan it is 
experience alone — in raw, amorphous and yet undeniably human form — which 
has superseded all attempts to forge a fi xed national and ethnic identity. 
 That a fl uid, collective experience overrides all fi xed categories is not an 
intellectual construct in Taiwan, but a fact of daily existence for the average resident 
on the island. Benedict Anderson has argued that nationalism became possible with 
the intersection of capitalism, print technology and educational systems together 
creating a cohesive sense of the “national” since people now could identify with 
other large groups they could now at least imagine.3 Yet most people to a greater 
or lesser extent believe in the ontology of these “imagined communities” which 
underlie their shared sense of national identity. In Taiwan, however, most people 
do not. Ongoing conditions there have forced its denizens to be hyper-aware of 
how imaginary everything is, how every label appears to be a phantom of sorts. For 
decades they were repeatedly told that Taiwan is inseparable from China, and they 
are thus Chinese. Today they are now more likely to be told that they are not Chinese 
at all, but “Taiwanese.” Both arguments are based on either culture or ancestry. Yet 
in her investigation of the Taiwanese identity problem, Melissa Brown notes that 
these are not what ultimately unites an ethnic group or nation. “Rather, identity is 
formed and solidifi ed on the basis of common social experience, including economic 
and political experience.”4 As a result of these experiences, polls consistently show 
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that the vast majority in Taiwan are deeply committed to avoiding all solutions, 
even labels — calling themselves both Chinese and Taiwanese, favoring neither 
reunifi cation nor independence.5 Of two minds, the Taiwanese as a whole have 
doggedly pursued a middling status quo — for perpetuity if at all possible — as if 
they are forever holding their cards to their chest, never laying them down for the 
world to see, never allowing the hand to be played. Taiwan is an island based on the 
ongoing art of collective ambivalence. 
 Who is to blame for this? Just about everyone: the KMT government which 
ruled Taiwan for over a half a century, the Ming and Qing dynasties, the Europeans, 
the Japanese, the Americans, certainly the mainland Communists, not to mention 
indigenous politicians presently calling for independence. Together all of these 
parties have made experience itself into a capricious teacher on Taiwan. Never 
allowed to exist on its own, this is an island literally caught in between, always 
subject to a historical prejudice where Taiwan is nothing more than a strategic, 
geopolitical tool, a mere appendage of something purportedly greater. A virtual 
ice palace created by the Cold War, Taiwan today somehow has not “melted” into 
oblivion as often predicted. Instead it has survived, even thrived, against all odds. 
 Not coincidently Hou rose to prominence in the 1980s. He translates this 
larger state of affairs in indelible cinematic terms which capture, convey, perhaps 
even embody, the elusive, slippery contours of that collective experience, with 
no fi xed identities, no rhetorical clarities, no balmy certitudes. At fi rst, Hou 
focuses exclusively on Taiwan’s experience from the late 1950s onwards, since he 
experienced this fi rsthand. The roots of that strange state of affairs, however, go 
back centuries. Nevertheless, Hou’s later career belies a Wittgenstein-like art of 
historical selection and omission: instead of focusing on the standard historical 
claims made on Taiwan, Hou’s historical fi lms focus mostly on those eras that most 
complicate these claims. We shall explore briefl y what these “claims” are and how 
they affect Taiwan to this day.
Competing Historical “Claims” up to 1949
By virtual default, the strongest claim on Taiwan is China’s. Yet this does not mean 
that the Chinese claim on Taiwan is as unequivocal as the current government 
of the PRC asserts. China is an especially historically minded culture which has 
copiously recorded its own past. Yet in all the profuse records of China up to the 
seventeenth century there is no hint of Chinese designs on Taiwan. By that point 
China was nearing the end of its second millennium of recorded imperial history 
spanning several dynasties. The earliest Chinese arrivals to Taiwan usually came 
seasonally and illegally, and in small numbers. They were far outnumbered by the 
local aboriginal population at the time. More permanent Chinese settlements only 
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began in earnest via the impetus provided by the Dutch colony set up on the island 
in the seventeenth century.6 Eerily similar to what happened in the twentieth century, 
soon unsolicited political events in China spilled over onto the island. As the Ming 
dynasty deteriorated, a Ming general (Zheng Chenggung, aka “Koxinga”) came 
over and drove out the Dutch, a feat that today earns him the title as “the Father 
of Taiwan.” Yet Zheng’s eyes were set on returning to China, a cause continued by 
his successors. Only the failure of Zheng’s son to drive out the Qing dynasty led to 
the formal annexation of Taiwan by the Chinese government in 1684, merely for 
security reasons.7 
 What follows is the two-hundred-plus-year rule of the island by the last Chinese 
dynasty. The Qing treated Taiwan with a great deal of reluctance and ambivalence, 
fi nding it more trouble than it was worth. (In fact, initially the Qing offered the 
Dutch to buy the island back, which was declined.)8 Seemingly stuck with Taiwan, 
the Qing rulers made almost no effort to develop it. Emigration to Taiwan remained 
either illegal or greatly restricted for many of those years, and it seemed as if the 
most corrupt and inept governors were sent there. Each governor served short, three-
year terms, and none made Taiwan their home. During these 211 years of Qing rule, 
the locals — whether of Chinese descent or the aboriginals — protested against the 
Qing government no fewer than seventy-three times, and resorted to violence no 
less than sixty other times.9 Taiwan remained a place of unruly character, attracting 
Chinese of pioneering stock who desired to escape conditions in China, most of all 
the rampant poverty and scarce land in nearby Fujian province. These independent-
minded immigrants in turn were looked down upon by those who remained in 
China. Already the economic, social, political and cultural developments in Taiwan 
had diverged from China as a whole. The Qing did nothing to mitigate this; in fact, 
their policies only widened this split.10
 Even with ten thousand troops on the island,11 evidence of nominal rule, if not 
misrule, indicated to foreign colonial powers that China had little effective control 
over Taiwan. Only in the nineteenth century, when Qing rulers noticed foreign 
designs on Taiwan, did they begin to pay the island more heed. First, the government 
in Beijing lifted all bans on emigration.12 After a brief confl ict with the French, the 
Qing government decided to make Taiwan a full-fl edged province in 1885 instead of 
a mere part of Fujian. For the fi rst time Taiwan had a competent ruler with foresight 
named Liu Mingchuan, who not only established a stable administration, but also 
began to build an infrastructure that included railroads and electricity. However, 
Liu left in 1891, and inexplicably all of his plans for modernization were dropped. 
Taiwan fell once more into a state of gross neglect.13 
 In 1895, when the Qing dynasty lost a war with the Japanese over Korea, 
China’s historical attitude towards Taiwan became clear. The Chinese government 
signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki and ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan “in 
perpetuity.” By all international standards of the time, this was considered a legal 
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agreement, and even the West recognized Taiwan as now being a part of Japan.14 
That China easily parted with the island to save itself indicates not a belief that 
Taiwan was native soil so much as a burdensome appendage best excised from the 
mainland body.
 Unlike the Qing era, which is conspicuously absent in Hou’s historically minded 
oeuvre concerning Taiwan, the Japanese colonial era (1895–1945) forms at least 
part of the historical backdrop in the famed historical trilogy of City of Sadness, The 
Puppetmaster and Good Men, Good Women. Yet in doing so, Hou is not bolstering a 
Japanese “counterclaim” to China’s. He very well could have. Using criteria such as 
effective rule and development, one could say the Japanese have a stronger claim on 
Taiwan than the Chinese. Even most mainland Chinese at the time seemed to accept 
that Taiwan was no longer Chinese soil. Sun Yat-sen, the father of modern China, 
said that Taiwan should become an independent nation in the 1920s. Even during the 
war with Japan, Chiang Kai-shek in 1938, and the Communists as late as 1941, all 
thought it best for Taiwan to become independent of Japan, not returned to China. It 
was not the usual dictates of history, culture nor ancestry which demanded the return 
of Taiwan to China. It was desperate, wartime politics.15 Everything changed in 1943 
at the Cairo Conference when the United States offered Taiwan to Chiang Kai-shek 
to ensure his not suing for a separate peace with Japan. In retrospect it was a major 
blunder on the part of the United States. According to George Kerr, an American 
observer at the time who was intimately familiar with Taiwan, the Cairo Declaration 
set in train “a long series of events which are now cause for deep regret.”16
 One other thing to keep in mind: there was not a strong national identity 
among the Taiwanese as one fi nds among the Koreans during the same time period 
when they also suffered under Japanese tutelage. Even in 1945, even after fi fty-one 
years of Japanese “corruption,” this amorphous identity was amenable to the idea 
of becoming Chinese once again — or maybe for the fi rst time. This was the stated 
goal of the new rulers, the KMT Nationalists. Yet in very short order — in a few 
months, in fact — the actions of the KMT virtually ensured the opposite of their 
rhetoric: a new and more permanent Taiwanese identity was being etched in deep 
pools of blood. This all came to a head in the 228 Incident in February of 1947, 
which will be discussed in detail in chapter 3. For now suffi ce it to say that the 
new Nationalist government behaved even more like a colonizer than its Japanese 
predecessor, and with greater brutality resulting in the deaths of thousands. The 
KMT’s indecorous, brutal behavior was widely reported in China. Soon 228 would 
become a focal point of resistance to the KMT throughout China, accelerating its 
eventual defeat there which came only two years later.17 Ironically, the incident 
literally created a self-made hostile corner in Taiwan which the KMT would fi nd 
itself backed into in 1949. 
 After all these capricious historical turns, what does this term “Taiwanese” 
really mean? It depends. “Taiwan” and “Taiwanese” have been terms of convenience 
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refl ecting certain geopolitical realities, but not terms readily embraced by those 
who once ruled the island, or those across the straits who desire to rule it one 
day. In the murky semantic border between the words “Chinese” and “Taiwanese” 
is addled a further, domestic complication, one that is diffi cult to clarify in 
English. Ever since the late 1940s, a differentiation is made by those known as 
benshengren (“original province people”) and those called waishengren (“outer 
province people”). The former are multi-generational Taiwanese with mainland 
ancestry but whose roots on the island go back centuries. Historically this was not 
a unifi ed group because they included a signifi cant Hakka minority which has its 
own dialect and customs, and which often has come into confl ict with the Hoklo 
majority. The Hoklo are comprised mostly of Fujianese immigrants who speak the 
Taiwanese dialect similar to the Fujianese dialect spoken directly across the Straits 
of Taiwan. By contrast, the waishengren are recent arrivals, those mainlanders who 
came over after 1945, the majority of whom came in 1949 when the KMT lost 
China to the Communists. Roughly speaking, the benshengren make up 85% of 
the population on the island today, while the “mainlander” waishengren comprise 
close to 14%. The remaining 1% of the current population is mostly made up of a 
declining aboriginal population. In ethnic terms, this means that close to 99% of 
the population on Taiwan is of Chinese descent, but this does not make them any 
more “Chinese” than Canadians of English descent are “English,” or Mexicans 
of Spanish descent are “Spanish.” Moreover, with each passing day it becomes 
more and more accurate to call all residents on the island (including waishengren) 
Taiwanese, not Chinese, given how radically different the historical experiences on 
Taiwan have been from mainland China. 
 In any case, after 1949 both the benshengren and the waishengren on the island 
were cut off from China, forced to live together with quietly festering historical 
wounds which have never completely healed. After initially trying to justify their 
actions, for nearly forty years offi cials simply denied the massacre in 1947 had 
ever happened. Yet when Taiwan, with bitter irony, became the last bastion of the 
Nationalists, the government was forced to modify its stance in radical ways if it 
was to survive. The KMT lacked real legitimacy after the 228 Incident, a key factor 
in the reforms it eventually undertook, resulting in a checkered record like that of 
the previous Japanese administration. The Taiwanese benshengren would be at fi rst 
the recipients of change, later the benefi ciaries of change, and fi nally the masters 
of change, changes which fi rst manifested themselves on the economic front, and 
eventually bore fruit on both the political and cultural fronts. These created the 
Taiwan we know today: an economic dynamo and one of the most democratic 
“nations” on earth with a vibrant culture to boot, including a particular fi lm director 
now of world renown. 
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Hou and the Post-War Taiwanese Experience
Hou Hsiao-hsien literally enters this picture in 1949. Westerners and mainland 
Chinese have their share of mistaken notions about Hou, but the Taiwanese have 
their own. Until recent years, the most common local misperception was that Hou is 
a benshengren. Hou has cultivated that persona publicly: he speaks fl uent Taiwanese 
and speaks Mandarin with a heavy Taiwanese infl ection. Furthermore, his fi lms 
seem to express fully what it means to be Taiwanese, most of all for benshengren. 
Thus many in Taiwan are surprised to discover that Hou is a waishengren who 
was born in mainland China in 1947, and moved to Taiwan when he was only two 
years old. Hou’s family is Hakka, the special peripatetic Chinese minority who were 
often persecuted by the Han majority in Taiwan before 1895.18 Still, Hou grew up 
in southern Taiwan, mostly among benshengren. Hou’s father died when he was 
young, allowing him to wander outside more than was the norm for children of the 
time. These self-guided wanderings forced him to use Taiwanese on a daily basis at 
a young age, and proved to be defi nitive infl uences. 
 Thus, Hou for much of his life would identify most with the group he should 
have had the most tenuous ties with, the benshengren. This indicates how much his 
actual experience, not ancestry, nor any fi xed cultural ideology, determines Hou’s 
identity and world view. Being both Hakka and a waishengren only increased Hou’s 
sensitivity. Chu Tian-wen, a renowned author and Hou’s scriptwriter, explains why it 
was that those of her generation — born of at least one parent from the mainland, yet 
growing up in Taiwan — would be among the leading proponents of the Taiwanese 
Experience in the cultural realm. At home they only heard about China which she 
later found to be imaginary once she went there. Yet it was the Taiwan before their 
eyes that they experienced fi rsthand, a world entirely different from the hearth-side 
stories of the mainland. That diasporic tension, non-existent for multi-generational 
Taiwanese who take everything around them as a matter of course, proved to be 
fertile artistic ground.19
 For writers like Chu and fi lmmakers like Hou, Taiwan would prove to be 
a virtually bottomless reservoir of thematic material. But what did Hou witness 
and experience? In a word, change: politically, economically, culturally and 
cinematically. When Hou becomes a director himself in 1980, all of these changes 
were either already occurring or about to.
Hou’s Post-War Political Experience
Hou’s father was a low-level bureaucrat who came over to Taiwan to lead an 
uneventful existence until his premature death. There is scant evidence that Hou 
and his family were ever directly affected by post-war politics. Still, the political 
Hou and the Taiwanese Experience 19
was pervasive in post-war Taiwan, always lurking in the background of daily life. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the same is true of Hou’s fi lms, at least those which do 
make some political references: A Time to Live, A Time to Die (1985), City of 
Sadness (1989) and Good Men, Good Women (1995). Hou has often been criticized 
for his political ambivalence and evasion. Few can even locate him on Taiwan’s 
true political spectrum, which is not “Right versus Left” (a distinction with little 
meaning in Taiwan), but “Independence versus Reunifi cation.” What people fail to 
realize is how typical Hou’s politics are in Taiwan. Most residents there hold both 
politics and politicians in low esteem, a direct result of a half century of oppressive 
KMT rule. The benshengren majority even had a common saying that “getting 
involved in politics is like eating dog shit.”20 
 In hindsight, it seems clear enough that the KMT government could not have 
kept this up forever: despite its basic ideological premise as a government of the 
“Republic of China,” which purportedly represents all of China, no amount of 
propaganda could disguise the fact that it ruled only Taiwan and a few other smaller 
islands. On the other hand, there was some historical luck in their favor. When Chiang 
Kai-shek and what remained of the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949, it seemed on 
its last legs. The party had lost so much credibility that it was cut off even from U.S. 
support. The mainland Communists had drawn up plans for an imminent invasion 
of the island to fi nish off the Nationalists once and for all. All this changed with the 
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. Two days after it began, the United States sent 
the Seventh Fleet to the Straits of Taiwan. The Korean confl ict simultaneously ended 
plans by the Communists to attack the island.21 Taiwan had once again undergone 
another dramatic metamorphosis: it became a KMT-led fortress on the front lines of 
the Cold War. 
 This tense Cold War atmosphere pervaded the 1950s, and reached its height 
in August of 1958 with the so-called “Cannon War” with the PRC over the islands 
of Kinmen and Matsu, both within eyesight of Fujian province. Chiang Kai-shek’s 
hope was to get the United States directly involved in an attack against mainland 
China, but the Americans only offered indirect aid and even tried unsuccessfully to 
convince the KMT to relinquish control over the two islands. Finally a compromise 
between the two distrustful allies was reached in October: the ROC would no longer 
attack the PRC in exchange for continued control over Kimmen and Matsu. The 
Chinese Communists protested, but some have speculated that Mao secretly agreed 
to Nationalist control over these two islands. Being so close to the mainland, this 
would help mitigate any drive towards Taiwanese independence.22 The result is a 
stalemate which persists to this day: Kinmen and Matsu remain under the control of 
the ROC, not the PRC.
 The tense, paranoid atmosphere of the Cold War was well suited for Chiang’s 
quest for absolute power over the island. Smaller, local sections of the party were 
all inextricable parts of larger sections leading directly to the top — the Central 
No Man an Island20
Committee controlled by Chiang himself.23 This reorganization dovetailed with 
existing laws such as the Mobilization Anti-Rebellion Law in 1948, and martial 
law, which was declared in June of 1949 and not lifted until 1987. The former order 
greatly increased Chiang’s presidential powers, allowing him to wipe out dissent 
of any sort. Along with the martial law, the 1948 law formed the basis of what 
would be known as the “White Terror.” In effect, Taiwan became a police/military 
state that was centered in the National Defense Committee (later called the National 
Security Council), through which Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, 
controlled all vital information and intelligence gathering.24 
 The Cold War served as a ready-made smoke screen to divert attention away 
from the possibility of Taiwanese independence. Indeed, the announced intentions 
of many KMT policies were to fi ght communism, yet the actual targets included 
groups who advocated independence and showed no interest in communism 
whatsoever. Nevertheless, there was local resistance to the KMT which dates back to 
1947, especially among Taiwanese exiles. Within Taiwan itself resistance developed 
more slowly. Still, even in the 1950s there were people who began to question the 
premise of the “Republic of China.” The fi rst sign was the journal, Free China, 
which initially supported the KMT, but eventually became quite critical of the party 
and was consequently shut down.25 During the 1970s, a second wave of opposition 
arose and gained momentum as the decade progressed. The reason is clear enough: 
legitimacy, already a vexing problem for the KMT, only worsened as the decade 
wore on. Once the government lost its UN seat in 1972, it was less able to defl ect 
resistance. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek himself would die in 1975, by which point 
effective control had already passed to Chiang Ching-kuo.
 On the surface, the son seemed of the same political ilk as his father. Chiang 
Ching-kuo had been a key player on the political scene before 1972, effectively 
running Taiwan for his father through a number of key positions, most of all in 
intelligence gathering and the military. Once he came to the forefront in the 1970s, he 
still utilized a centralized system in a sometimes capricious manner. Chiang Ching-
kuo, however, never shared his father’s obsession with recovering the mainland, 
a crucial difference. Instead, he engaged in pragmatic policies that centered on 
Taiwan, beginning major infrastructure projects that helped to modernize the 
island. Most importantly, the younger Chiang began a process of “localization” that 
allowed native Taiwanese into the administration, as well as into the party itself.26 
This would have a profound effect on Taiwan in the long run, in part because it 
meant the inclusion in 1988 of Chiang’s successor Lee Teng-hui (Li Denghui), who 
was a benshengren. 
 In the new climate of the 1970s was born the “outside-the-party movement,” 
(Dang wai). This movement at fi rst consisted of non-KMT candidates who ran, and 
sometimes won, in local elections despite widespread KMT fraud. Once the United 
States withdrew recognition of the ROC government in December of 1978, things 
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came to a head a year later in southern Taiwan. The so-called “Formosa Incident,” 
sometimes known as the “Kaohsiung Incident,” was the fi rst major public protest 
against the KMT since the 228 Incident of 1947. The leaders of “the party without 
a name” staged a mass human rights rally in Kaohsiung on December 10, 1979, 
the International Day for Human Rights. When the police in Kaohsiung came out 
in force to intimidate the large crowds, the people did not give in, even breaking 
through police lines. Upon seeing this, one witness said, “History has had a new 
beginning.”27 This opened the fl oodgates of the 1980s.
 Hou was not involved in any of this. During the 1970s Hou was slowly 
working his way up in the Taiwanese fi lm industry, showing no evidence of taking 
any political sides along the way. There was no indication during that time that he 
would take on the roles and issues and controversies he would eventually become 
embroiled in. But things change in Taiwan — even overnight.
Hou’s and the Post-War Economic Experience
The “Economic Miracle” is undoubtedly the best known aspect of the Taiwanese 
Experience abroad, and Hou’s fi lms allude to it on occasion. Even Hou’s own career 
partially refl ects this. Cinema was one industry which seemed to miss the Economic 
Miracle. However, Hou ended up working in the commercial fi lm industry for over 
a decade before venturing out in his own virtual cottage industry. This is quite 
typical in Taiwan: Hou presently operates a small-level enterprise creating a product 
primarily for export, albeit in his case it is for a niche market, not a mass one.
 What is often overlooked is how directly linked the Economic Miracle is to the 
228 Incident. The primary cause of the 1947 uprising, and the subsequent bloodbath, 
was economic. For as long as it could, the KMT tried to maintain absolute power in 
Taiwan, and only slowly relinquished that power as circumstances dictated. When 
it comes to economics, however, the KMT relinquished power almost from the start 
because it really had no other choice. For Taiwan this was the second modernization, 
one that far surpassed what the Japanese had done. For the KMT, it was their fi rst 
modernization. No longer would they be caged in the land-locked, agrarian mentality 
of war-torn China. Instead they quickly learned to rely on international trade.
 Given how spectacularly this economy performed over the last few decades, 
it is easy to forget that the prognosis for Taiwan’s economy was poor in the 1950s, 
especially with the sudden infl ux of 1.5 million people from the mainland. Taiwan had 
an unfavorable land-to-population ratio, minimal capital resources and a discredited 
leadership, all of which gave the country “basket case” status in the eyes of foreign 
economists.28 Yet from such inauspicious beginnings, the island experienced growth 
records that are among the highest in human history. The industrial sector grew 
12.2% a year from 1953 to 1964, during which time Taiwan received ample aid from 
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the United States. After American aid was dropped, Taiwan’s economic performance 
spurted ahead. The industrial sector grew at an annual rate of 16.1% from 1965 
to 1975.29 The economy as a whole, including the relatively stagnant agricultural 
sector, grew on average 10% a year from 1963 to 1980. Once the economy had fully 
matured, the island still recorded an annual rate of growth of 7.5% from 1981 to 
1995.30 Of central importance in this picture is how the populace at large benefi ted. 
The average Taiwanese in 1950 had the personal income of the average mainland 
Chinese. By the 1980s, the per capita income in Taiwan was twenty times that of 
mainland China.31 
 Several specifi c policies by the KMT fostered this astronomical growth. A 
thoroughgoing land reform turned land capital into business capital, laying the 
groundwork for economic development. Local landowners on the island did not 
resist, since the 228 Incident was still fresh in their memories. At the same time, 
however, the KMT government gave these landless landowners a stake in major 
government industries, effectively ending a feudal system by transforming its primary 
benefi ciaries into capitalists.32 Another key to Taiwan’s economic development was 
privatization.33 Overall the government held back publicly owned industries while 
allowing privately owned ones to thrive. By 1959, the percentage of industrial 
enterprises that were privately run exceeded those run by the government.34 From 
only 43% of industrial production being privately owned in 1954, the percentage 
had jumped to 80% in 1972, and 90% by the mid-1980s, making Taiwan, by any 
standard, one of the most privately owned economies in the world.35 The economy 
became highly decentralized, dominated by small- and medium-sized enterprises 
to an extent not found elsewhere. In 1981, 45% of the manufacturing was done by 
small- and medium-sized businesses. In the most successful and dynamic part of 
Taiwan’s economy, manufacturing for export, the percentage jumped to 68% of the 
total.36 Moreover, the main benefi ciaries of this policy were the benshengren, not 
the “elite” of recent mainland descent. Stringent educational, political and cultural 
policies notwithstanding, the mainlanders had neither the gall nor the wherewithal 
to stand in the way of a hostile majority as they had done in 1947.
 The government also steered the economy towards export. Taiwan is heavily 
trade-oriented: by the 1980s, exports and imports accounted for over 85% of its 
economy, a startling fi gure when you realize that in Japan the fi gure is only 30%.37 
Back in the 1950s, the government utilized the so-called “import-substitution policy” 
common to many newly industrialized nations. This focused on developing the 
domestic market through protectionist measures. In Taiwan this policy was unusually 
successful, largely because this was a temporary measure restricted mostly to the 
capital goods industry. For consumer goods, unfi nished goods and manufacturing as 
a whole, almost all the growth came from fi lling domestic demand and almost none 
from import substitution per se. In the Philippines, by contrast, nearly one quarter to 
one third of the growth in all four of these areas was due to import-substitution, and 
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only 60–70% to fi lling domestic demand. This in the long run weakened industries 
in the Philippines.38 Soon the ROC government steered Taiwan towards an outward-
looking economy by encouraging export over import. In 1959, they abolished a 
dual currency exchange-rate system, devalued the currency, reduced tariffs and set 
up laws, regulations and tax rates that all encouraged exporting.39 Perhaps no other 
decision made by the KMT-led government has so markedly improved the lives of 
the Taiwanese.
 In short, while denied a political stake for decades, the Taiwanese benshengren 
were already given a strong stake in the economy even at the height of the Cold 
War. The Taiwanese majority took advantage of this economic leeway to the fullest, 
even to the point of fl outing its often poorly enforced legal boundaries. As a result, 
Taiwan has been much like an underground economy that operates above ground. 
The government did retain strict control in banking, and getting a loan was diffi cult 
for the average Taiwanese. To get around this, the Taiwanese set up thousands of 
ad hoc private credit associations (biaohui) to raise their own capital, a remarkably 
risky venture that pays off handsomely if all the members in any one group are 
trustworthy.40 Many businesses would openly operate without licenses, and most 
would keep two account books, one for themselves, and a diminutive version for 
tax collectors. The population in general tends to under-report its income to the 
government, making the true per capita income hard to measure. By the 1980s, 
wealth in Taiwan was to be found everywhere, largely the result of both hard work 
and disdain for government interference. The KMT-led government observed this 
collective civil disobedience, and understood that its only choice was mostly to look 
the other way. Meanwhile Hou and others of the New Cinema in the 1980s, when 
this Economic Miracle was now an established fact, began to explore what this all 
meant for the people actually living on the island. Their answers reveal a great deal 
of ambivalence.
Hou and the Slow Thaw of Taiwan’s Post-War Culture
If Hou Hsiao-hsien’s links with both post-war politics and economics are more 
indirect, the same cannot be said for post-war culture, where Hou becomes a 
central fi gure. For most people, the fi rst thing that comes to mind with Taiwan is 
economics, followed perhaps by politics. By contrast, culture in Taiwan is usually 
an afterthought, and even then it is often dismissed as being either nonexistent or 
nothing more than a Chinese derivative. However, for those already aware of the 
fi lm festival scene in the last two decades, the opposite is true: when they think of 
Taiwan, they are likely to think of Hou fi rst, plus others such as Edward Yang and 
Tsai Ming-liang. What they often miss is how inextricably linked Hou the cultural 
phenomenon is to these larger political and economic forces within Taiwan. 
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 Since 1949, Taiwanese culture has been caught between these political and 
economic forces described above. Taiwan’s culture began as a centripetal force under 
the tight control of the KMT government, only to eventually become a centrifugal 
force which now plays unoffi cial diplomatic roles denied to the government itself. 
In addition, the unsettled nature of the Taiwanese situation has made Taiwanese 
culture even more dynamic and inventive. Hou is not the only evidence of that, but 
he is one of the best. 
 Once again, this cultural dynamic originated in some of the most inauspicious 
conditions imaginable. Among the émigrés to Taiwan in 1949 were some of China’s 
best and brightest, many who came not out of loyalty toward the KMT as out of fear 
of the Communists. A motley group, circumstances forced them to live and raise their 
children on the island, only slowly realizing there was no going back. Still, for quite 
some time there were strict limits as to what they could express about this strange, 
new world. By dint of a government monopoly over culture, education and the media, 
there was a concerted effort to foist a Chinese identity on the local population and 
suppress anything distinctively Taiwanese.41 The prevailing feeling at the time was 
that the KMT’s loss on the mainland was due to a failure of propaganda, not policy. 
In Taiwan, the party was not about to make the same mistake again. Culture was a 
key component in what the KMT saw as a fi ght to the death.
 Government control pervaded all cultural areas, but it was particularly stringent 
in the education of young people. “The Three Principles of the People,” the offi cial 
ideology of the state, permeated every area of academic life. A key organization was 
a China Youth Anti-Communist Salvation League started in 1952. This organization 
established political activities and military training for young people.42 Designed to 
focus attention on the “communist bandits” a mere hundred miles away, it was also 
part of a large-scale effort to eradicate anything specifi cally “Taiwanese.” Other 
educational policies were at the forefront of this tacit strategy as well: starting in 
1951, all classes had to be taught in Mandarin, and native Taiwanese children were 
punished by harsh fi nes every time they spoke a word of the Taiwanese dialect in 
the classroom.43 Such practices survived up to the 1970s. (Hou’s own fl uency in the 
Taiwanese dialect came not from the classroom, but from the streets.)
 The government also provided direct guidance over literature and cinema. 
In 1950, the China Association for Literature and the Arts was set up with ten 
members, one of whose responsibility was to oversee fi lm. This resulted in heavily 
propagandistic art imbued with anti-communist themes while extolling the virtues 
of Sun Yat-sen’s “Three Principles of the People.”44 The stranglehold was further 
tightened in 1954 when this association announced a government policy called “The 
Cultural Cleansing Movement.” This campaign had the expressed goal of ridding 
the culture of all “Red” (communistic), “Black” (pessimistic views of the underside 
of society) and “Yellow”  (licentious, pornographic) elements. The three undesirable 
“colors” in turn formed the sweeping basis for all subsequent government censorship 
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which was taken over by the all-important GIO (Government Information Offi ce) in 
1955.45 In 1960, the tenth anniversary of the supreme cultural body from which the 
GIO took its cues reiterated these anti-“Red,” “Black” and “Yellow” principles.46
 Still, this was authoritarian control, not totalitarian. Cracks began to appear 
early on in various cultural arenas, and eventually in cinema as well. Despite such 
stringent government controls, even in the early years there were real debates over 
issues relevant to Taiwan, so long as they fell short of openly espousing Leftist ideas 
or Taiwanese independence. There were debates between “East” versus “West,” 
“indigenous culture” versus “modern culture.” A common theme in such debates 
was the relation of Chinese culture with modernization, most of all dealing with 
the relevance of Confucianism in the modern world. Many intellectuals in Taiwan 
became interested in what they called “Modern neo-Confucianism.” The point of 
agreement for these intellectuals was that Confucianism would have to be remade 
for modern times, and to do so required drawing from other traditions, including 
Buddhism and Western philosophy. Of particular importance in this regards was Mo 
Zongsan who tried to fi nd a link between Confucianism and the ethics of Kant.47 
Many others, however, envisioned a very different type of modernization, one that 
had little room for tradition altogether. The modern Confucians found themselves 
at odds with the Free China group and the growing popularity of existentialism in 
Taiwan, most of all the ideas of Sartre.48 
 Before the 1980s, the true cultural vanguard in Taiwan was undoubtedly 
literature, something best seen in the bitter disputes between two signifi cant 
movements: the Modernists (Xiandai wenxue) versus the so-called Nativists (Xiangtu 
wenxue). When restricted to philosophers and other scholars, the above mentioned 
debates seemingly stuck to the divide of East versus West. Once the debates spilled 
over into literature, however, other messages began to creep in almost imperceptibly, 
including early suggestions of a peculiarly Taiwanese political spectrum which now 
openly dominates the island today. 
 This began with the advent of the Modernist literary movement in the 1960s, 
directly linked to the rising popularity of Sartre at the time.49 The Modernist 
movement in Taiwan stood apart from all previous literature movements in Chinese 
history. By delving into psychological and philosophical issues, they steered clear 
of the primary obsession of modern Chinese literature during most of the twentieth 
century: national destiny. The Modernists instead emphasized artistry and refi nement, 
and resisted any prevailing political, moral or aesthetic prescriptions.50 Compared 
to Western Modernists, the Taiwanese counterparts were much more conservative; 
at the same time, however, they wrote about a collapse of Confucian ideals, and 
castigated the prevailing culture of the time.51 At the center of this movement in the 
1960s was the journal, Wen Xing. Initially Wen Xing focused on literature and the 
arts, but in the early 1960s, after the fall of Free China, it joined the debate between 
tradition and Westernization/modernization. The writers at Wen Xing clearly sided 
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with the latter camp, above all, the writer, Li Ao. As a result, the journal became 
more and more subject to attacks from the conservative ruling elite.52
 In the 1970s, however, the primary opponents of the Modernists were no 
longer the conservative elite, but from another literary movement that had also had 
its roots in certain writers from the 1960s: the Nativists. With the emergence of the 
Nativists, the division between tradition versus modernization and/or Westernization 
became more complicated, even muddled, since they set themselves against both the 
Modernists and the conservative ruling elite. The Nativists even saw the Modernists 
and the ruling elite in league in their joint eagerness (at least in the Nativists’ eyes) 
to emigrate at the fi rst sign of crisis in Taiwan, of which there were many in the 
1970s starting with the loss of the UN seat, thereby abandoning the common folk 
on the island. The Nativists also reacted aesthetically: in diametric opposition to the 
Westernized hermeticism of the Modernists, the Nativists brought to the fore a new 
ethnic consciousness refl ecting a new generation that had grown up in Taiwan.53 
The typical Nativist aesthetic strategy was a socially engaged realism, not aesthetic 
experimentation, and their avowed goal was to convey the details of everyday life 
in Taiwan as it really was.54 In 1977, the underlying rhetoric behind this movement 
came to the fore in a heated debate that occurred in a number of journals, and at a 
now famous conference called to discuss the movement. The upshot of this is what 
is now known as the “Nativist controversy.” 
 The Nativists started with an anti-Western premise, seemingly joining on one 
side of the East/West divide. Initially they asked why science books in Taiwan were 
often in English, not Chinese.55 From there their concerns centered on a Taiwan they 
perceived as a victim of a parasitic economic system that left the island dependent, 
not independent.56 Some writers depicted the underlying confl ict as being between 
Chinese culture and what they called a “Japanese/Western commercial culture.”57 
The numerous 1970s setbacks on the international stage led others to call for the 
Taiwanese to look to themselves, and no longer to the West.58 Indeed there was a 
sense of anxiety and a thinly veiled urgency to their words. Says one writer: “There 
will never be an international morality; one has to struggle for one’s own survival, 
using the most realistic means possible.”59
 But there was more than an anti-Western stance. While opponents of the time 
attacked the Nativist movement either on literary or anti-communist grounds, none 
of them clarifi ed the movement’s defi ning term. Translated literally, xiangtu means 
“native soil.” But which native soil does this refer to? One writer broaches the 
question as follows: “Our native soil is good; add to our sense of the native soil; 
allow us to recognize our native soil; be proud of our native soil. This will make us 
not easily tempted by things foreign, or be polluted by foreign culture.” Nevertheless, 
when he asks whether this native soil is China or Taiwan, he never answers one way 
or another.60 In hindsight, that was the central question. Later many declared that 
the ultimate criterion used by the Nativists was how much their literature exhibited 
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a “Taiwanese consciousness.”61 At the time, however, the Nativists as a whole 
were evasive on the issue of Taiwan versus China, perhaps because this was still 
a taboo subject: some of those identifi ed as Nativists favored a “Greater China” 
idea; others implicitly favored Taiwan instead of China.62 Where various people 
stood on this all-important question was not clarifi ed until the “Formosa Incident” 
of 1979 brought this issue of Taiwan versus China to the fore. After 1979, as both 
the cultural and political climate began to open up, many of the old divisions quickly 
became irrelevant, most of all the division between East versus West. Taiwan was 
now the cultural centerpiece.
 Still, all of these debates were intellectual debates, not popular ones. That they 
were even allowed to occur was largely because they had little encroachment in the 
lives of the average resident on the island. What was happening with the populace 
at large? Perhaps the best way to answer this is to look at how popular religion 
has developed in Taiwan. During the fi rst two decades after 1949, the numbers of 
Christians increased steadily in Taiwan. Hou’s own mother became a Christian after 
the death of his father, and she had a Christian burial, as seen in A Time to Live, 
A Time to Die. There was a large number of Christians in the ruling classes, and 
the KMT government in the 1960s and 1970s brought in famous evangelists and 
broadcast their religious rallies on local television.63 Still, the Christian Church 
in Taiwan was on both ends of the political spectrum. The largest protestant 
denomination in Taiwan, the Presbyterians, has played a key role in the Taiwanese 
Independence Movement, basing their challenge to the KMT on the example of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer in Nazi Germany.64 Yet given the average Taiwanese’s distrust 
of politics, the number of Christians in Taiwan has declined, proportionally 
speaking, starting as early as 1965.65 By stark contrast, the number of Buddhists and 
Taoists has exponentially exploded since that time. In 1960, there were just over 800 
temples registered as Buddhist in Taiwan; by 1989 there were over 4000. In 1960, 
there were close to 3000 Taoist temples; by 1989 there were nearly 8000.66 (This 
trend has not abated since: in the mid-1980s there were 800,000 declared Buddhists, 
whereas by the year 2000 the number had exceeded 5,000,000.)67 There appears 
to be a direct link between increasing wealth for the average Taiwanese and an 
increasing support of indigenous religions: often a steep rise in new temples follows 
an increase in average income by two or three years.68 Once again, this is in stark 
contrast to mainland China — in fact, it is currently the exact opposite.69 By this 
religious standard, the putatively more Westernized island is in fact more “native” 
— more “Chinese” even — than the behemoth across the straits. Yet these trends 
among the general population mesh seamlessly with their rapid modernization and 
adaptation of many Western practices as well.
 There is one other aspect of Taiwanese culture worth noting. Whether under 
the Japanese or at the height of the KMT’s control, Taiwan has always needed to 
reach out to the world to survive. Today, however, the unsettled political status of 
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Taiwan has dried up the normal avenues of diplomacy. This gives new meaning, 
even urgency, to cultural outreach and exchange, or what would be better termed as 
“cultural diplomacy.” In this regards fi lm has come to the forefront, with Hou the 
leading cinematic ambassador of Taiwan. But the real pioneer in this regards is the 
Cloud Gate Dance Company, founded in 1973 by Lin Huaimin. Cloud Gate was 
the fi rst modern dance company in Asia. Every year the company puts out a new 
performance, and they range from specifi c themes like Chinese emigrants to Taiwan 
(Legacy in 1978), to famous works in Chinese tradition (Nine Songs and Bamboo 
Dream in 2001), to works that exist in a purely abstract realm (Moonwater in 1999). 
Lin does draw from traditional elements, most of all Taoism and Buddhism. Yet its 
mélange of audacious acrobatics coupled with Cloud Gate’s signature movements 
of almost ghost-like calm, all accompanied by the music ranging from Bach to 
Arvo Part, speak to something much greater than the sum of its component parts of 
East and West.70 Such performances have proven to be an exportable commodity, 
making Lin the fi rst Taiwanese artist of international standing, but not the last. As a 
native benshengren, Lin Huaimin’s domestic cultural impact has been stupendous. 
As a teacher he had students like Peggy Chiao, who would later become one of 
the leading fi gures on the Taiwanese fi lm scene. Chiao avers that it was Lin that 
got her generation (including waishengren such as herself) to think about having 
a distinctive culture of their own. This idea fi ltered down into many other cultural 
realms, including cinema.71
Hou in the Taiwanese Film Industry
So where was Hou all this time? Not at the barricades or the front lines. Not even 
at the roundtables of debate. Instead Hou was largely insulated from many of these 
larger societal trends in a carefully sequestered world. In 1973, only one year after 
the ROC lost its UN seat, he joined the Taiwanese commercial fi lm industry, and 
began what fi rst promised to be an unremarkable career in an unremarkable cinema. 
A mere decade-plus later, Hou became Taiwan’s leading cultural ambassador abroad. 
This only makes sense after understanding the transformations of Taiwanese cinema 
which went hand in hand with larger transformations in Taiwan. Taiwan’s cinema 
has not simply refl ected and/or refracted these historical oddities discussed above; it 
has also played contrary roles in abetting them. In the past, cinema served as a tool 
for a historical and political whitewash. Then suddenly it came to play the opposite 
role in revealing long suppressed realities, not just on the screens on the island, but 
more importantly in the world at large. Hou in particular played a key role in this 
historical unearthing. 
 Still, the fi lm industry Hou joined in 1973 was then ill-equipped for such a 
task. Cinema anywhere is a conspicuous and pervasive entity, an artistic medium 
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requiring a high level of institutional support whether private or public, or both. As 
a result, it cannot avoid circumspection from society at large. Certainly, Taiwanese 
cinema could hardly have hoped to steer clear of these political, economic and 
cultural forces shaping the island over the last few decades. Yet despite the dramatic 
changes in Taiwanese cinema during the course of Hou’s career, the one constant 
is that the Taiwanese government, whether old or new, set policies that benefi ted 
others cinemas — most of all Hong Kong and Hollywood — at the expense of local 
production. Ironically, this would also be to Hou’s personal benefi t.
 A bona fi de commercial fi lm industry in Taiwan took a long time to develop. 
Despite Japan’s record as one of the greatest national cinemas in history, despite 
the thoroughness of Japan’s modernization program which transformed the island’s 
infrastructure, medicine, agriculture and culture, and as much as the island provided 
a wide variety of potential settings for fi lming, Taiwan did not become a production 
base for Japanese cinema as had occurred in Manchuria after 1931. Instead, Taiwan 
remained primarily a market for Japanese fi lms. By 1935, forty-eight theaters 
exclusively showed fi lms, thirty-one of which would survive until 1945.72 There 
was no real development of cinema between 1945 and 1949, given the tumultuous 
conditions. Therefore, the true history of Taiwanese cinema begins in 1949 when 
Taiwan becomes the KMT’s last theater of political operations. Still, it developed 
at a snail’s pace. Even when the government would try to nourish the fi lm industry 
with one hand, it would be strangling it with the other.
 By stark contrast, Hong Kong was developing a viable and eventually powerful 
commercial cinema, a fact which has goaded many in Taiwanese fi lm circles who 
often say, “If Hong Kong can do it, why not Taiwan?” After all, for a relatively small 
island, Taiwan has varied scenery with spectacular mountains, bountiful forests, 
beautiful coastlines, and even large plains on the western side of the island — all 
favorable conditions for fi lmmaking. Taiwan also has four times the population of 
the British colony. Once again, the answer is that the initial political and economic 
conditions, even up to the mid-1960s, were not conducive to developing a thriving 
fi lm industry.73 With the fall of China in 1949, only 5% of the Shanghai fi lm 
community moved to Taiwan, while many times that number moved to the greater 
freedoms beckoning in Hong Kong. Furthermore, those who did relocate to Taiwan 
in 1949 were mostly in the Agricultural Education Film Company, a government-
run studio that mainly engaged in documentary and propaganda work. This meant 
the arrival of a certain amount of equipment and technical personnel, but almost 
no creative talent to speak of.74 It is not hard to see why any Chinese fi lmmaker, 
producer or star not directly connected to the KMT government would either stay 
in Shanghai, or move to the stable and free environment of Hong Kong. In 1949, 
Taiwan held no prospects for long-term stability; even the KMT saw the island as 
merely a temporary base from which they were to one day retake the mainland. 
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 For the fi rst fi fteen years, Taiwanese cinema remained more of an itinerant 
roadshow than a real fi lm industry. The ROC government was more concerned with 
avoiding a repeat of the scenario of the Shanghai fi lm world in the 1930s — when 
the Left gained ascendancy over the Right. Thus, unlike the colonial government 
in Hong Kong, the KMT favored strict control of whatever fi lm “industry” existed, 
starting with oversight from the China Association for Literature and the Arts set up 
in 1950. The KMT government directly supervised every private fi lm company and 
fi lm organization in Taiwan. Any head of a public organization pertaining to fi lm 
in Taiwan was invariably a member of the party. The constant prescriptions from 
the GIO dictated a strong anti-communist stance, plus the anti-“Red,” “Black” and 
“Yellow” principles. 
 The crux of the matter was that fi lm was not afforded the same respect as other 
industries. The fi lm industry was declared a “special” industry and was squeezed 
for all it could yield. Never exceeding 30% anywhere else, in Taiwan entertainment 
taxes ran up to 60%. Stamp taxes on fi lm tickets were eleven times higher than 
those in any other industry. More importantly, customs duties on imported fi lm 
equipment, whether for production or exhibition, were all counted as “luxury items” 
and thus exceeded that of other industries by over 50%.75 This latter policy was to 
have a profound effect on the industry in the long run, most of all because it forced 
producers in Taiwan to cut corners with fi lm stock. Moreover, it would affect even 
the leading studio, the Central Motion Picture Company (hereafter the CMPC), 
which was formed in 1954 by combining the existing Agricultural Education Film 
Studio and the Taiwan Film Company (Tai ying), a holdover from the Japanese era.76 
Not surprisingly, the CMPC was under the direct control of the KMT party.
 As a result of tight governmental control, many documentaries and propaganda 
shorts were made, but almost no fi ctional features. Those that were produced were 
primarily for propaganda, not entertainment nor cultural enlightenment. The few 
features made in the 1950s were all box-offi ce disasters. Audiences were unmoved 
by their stereotypical characters, clumsy avoidance of offi cial taboos and crude 
production values. The fi rst feature-length fi lm, Waking from a Nightmare, was 
made using only 40,000 feet of expired Japanese stock leading to a fogging effect.77 
The second feature from the Agricultural Education Studio was Together Forever, 
an overt attempt at exorcizing the ghosts of the 228 Incident by presenting all rifts 
between benshengren and the newly arrived mainlanders as being Communist-
inspired.78 Sometimes the results were almost comical. One Taiwanese-language 
fi lm from the 1960s involved a postal worker who at a key moment in the plot 
lost some mail. This, however, was cut out by government censors since it would 
supposedly harm the image of postal workers. This excision, however, left the fi lm 
virtually incomprehensible.79 A 1959 propaganda fi lm, General of the Flying Tigers, 
spared no expense in depicting the training of Air Force pilots at the local Air Force 
Academy. Yet given the military’s requirement that no planes could be shown having 
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any problems or accidents, and no lives could be lost in the fi lm’s plot, the fi nished 
fi lm lacked dramatic tension, losing its propaganda potential as well.80 So extreme 
were government strictures that its own propaganda fi lms were not allowed to show 
communist fl ags or insignias, nor even images of Mao.81 Government policies also 
hurt any potential audience outside of Taiwan: the distribution rights for Waking 
from a Nightmare could not be sold in Singapore, Malaysia or Hong Kong because 
of its overt anti-“Communist bandit” themes. All three territories had relations with 
the mainland to consider.82 
 With production crippled, the growing number of Taiwanese theaters needed 
to be fi lled by somebody’s products. Of the 600 to 700 fi lms that could be screened 
annually, there were only two or three locally produced works in Mandarin available.83 
In Hong Kong, the commercial fi lm industry was unfettered by such political and 
economic constraints and from the start its fi lms were inundating Taiwan’s screens. 
Between 1950 and 1954, a total of 662 Mandarin-language features were shown 
on the island’s screens: most came from Hong Kong, a handful was older works 
from Shanghai and a mere thirteen were from Taiwan itself.84 The ROC government 
did use access to its lucrative market as leverage, exerting some infl uence over 
Hong Kong cinema through the Hong Kong and Kowloon Cinema and Theatrical 
General Association (also known as the “Freedom Association”) starting in 1953. 
This ensured that Hong Kong’s fi lms were politically palatable for the Taiwanese 
market.85 Yet Hong Kong in turn was able to extract advantages from the Nationalist 
government. Most crucial was in 1956 when Hong Kong’s Mandarin-language fi lms 
were exempted from the existing quota system and reclassifi ed as guopian (literally 
“national fi lms”). In effect, Hong Kong’s Mandarin-language fi lms were now 
classifi ed as a part of domestic production, giving their fi lms unlimited access to the 
Taiwanese market. This policy further consolidated Hong Kong’s domination of the 
Taiwanese market.86 As Lu Feiyi aptly summarizes, “No matter what is the cause 
and what is the effect, what is certain is that the government, in trying to win over 
the Hong Kong industry, gave Hong Kong fi lms unlimited access to the Taiwanese 
market. Hong Kong, seeing this opportunity, maximized its own production with 
Taiwan in mind, and this had a profound effect on the Taiwanese industry itself.”87
 Other policies further abetted this situation. A key member of the Freedom 
Association, Huang Zhuohan, negotiated with the ROC government about the 
unreasonable customs duties on fi lm stock and equipment. This led to new laws 
relaxing customs duties on imported fi lm supplies for those companies associated 
with the Freedom Association in Hong Kong.88 Any member of the association was 
allowed to import fi lm stock and equipment into Taiwan for a six-month period, 
duty-free. While this was designed to encourage Hong Kong fi lm production in 
Taiwan itself, early on fi lmmakers would submit a script for a two-hour picture, 
make only an eighty-minute fi lm, and sell the remaining stock on the local black 
market. So widespread was this practice that in 1958 the GIO ended the duty-free 
policy for imported fi lm stock, retaining it for fi lm equipment alone.89
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 Unexpectedly, the new policies yielded not more Mandarin fi lms made in 
Taiwan, but instead the fi rst major wave of fi lms produced in the Taiwanese dialect. 
Although the government at this time hoped to supplant Taiwanese with Mandarin, 
its primary means of doing so was the education system, not cinema. The KMT had 
no problem in the meantime with Taiwanese-language fi lms so long as they carried 
the correct propaganda messages, or at least did not run counter to the offi cial line. 
Local producers in Taiwan could now get fi lm stock from Hong Kong sources, 
thus bypassing exorbitant import duties. Between 1955 and 1959, a total of 178 
Taiwanese-language fi lms were made in Taiwan, more than three times those made 
in Mandarin.90 
 One should not construe this as the beginning of a bona fi de private industry, 
however. In fact, the object was not regular studio production so much as short-
term speculation and exploitation by fl y-by-night operators. The numbers may 
be somewhat impressive, but the fi lms for the most part were not. Given that fi lm 
stock remained a precious commodity, producers used as little as possible. Some 
simply dumped fi lm stock on the black market, making the actual creation of fi lms 
of secondary concern.91 The director of the fi rst Taiwanese dialect fi lm in 1956, He 
Jiming, did everything in his power to not have any outtakes. He rehearsed several 
times before shooting, and utilized the seven-to-eight feet of leader in every reel 
for empty transitional shots in the fi nished fi lm. In the end he used only 9500 feet 
of stock with almost no outtakes.92 One of the most well-known directors of these 
Taiwanese-language fi lms was Xin Qi, who has over ninety fi lms in the local dialect 
to his credit. According to Xin, the determining factors were the high cost of fi lm 
stock and lack of time: “The fi lm we used for Taiwanese-language movies in those 
days was generally imported, or bought on the black market. One movie required 
800 shots on average. With the high cost of fi lm, we could not afford to waste it. 
Also, we were making so many movies — around 100 a year — that the time spent 
fi lming each was very short, about two or three days per movie.”93 Even when more 
upscale Mandarin-language production emerged in the next decade, there would 
still be echoes of these same corner-cutting production practices.
 There is no denying that the 1960s saw the beginning of a more bona fi de 
fi lm industry in Taiwan. Nevertheless, the 1950s laid the groundwork for all that 
followed, even the New Cinema in the 1980s. As shoddy as the production system 
was, Taiwanese-dialect fi lms became a training ground for later industry talent such 
as Li Xing, who became the godfather of Taiwanese fi lm directors. In the 1950s, the 
only healthy economic players in the local fi lm industry were distributors such as 
the CMPC and the privately run Union (Lian bang). Distributors would eventually 
decide the long-term fate of the local fi lm industry even in the 1980s. Government 
policies, Hong Kong’s early ascendancy in the local market, lagging indigenous 
fi lm production, issues surrounding fi lm stock and the burgeoning power of local 
distributors — for all the changes that Taiwanese cinema would undergo starting in 
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the 1960s, this same phalanx of issues would remain pertinent when Hou and the 
New Cinema began in the early 1980s. Indeed, the New Cinema might never have 
been born without these preconditions. 
 In 1963, the face of Taiwanese cinema was altered dramatically due to a 
confl uence of events both within Taiwan and without. The “without,” once again, 
was Hong Kong. In that year, Love Eterne was released by the Shaw Brothers 
studio. A Mandarin-language opera fi lm of a type known as huangmeidiao (Yellow 
Plum Opera), this fi lm achieved monumental success at the time in Taiwan, and 
has retained cult status ever since. It played for a record 186 days in Taipei and 
took in more than NT$8 million at the box offi ce, beating all existing records. 
(Its achievement was not surpassed until Jackie Chan’s Project A [1983].) Hong 
Kongers began to call Taipei “a Crazy Man’s City” as a result.94 Love Eterne’s 
economic impact on Taiwan was long-lasting. It highlighted the true importance 
of the Taiwanese market for Hong Kong. It also led many theaters in Taiwan to 
break their contracts with American companies and begin showing Mandarin fi lms 
instead.95 Furthermore, it jump-started a full-fl edged private fi lm industry when the 
director of the fi lm, Li Hanxiang (aka Li Han-hsiang), suddenly moved to Taiwan, 
bringing with him technical and artistic talent plus big plans. Li was already the 
best-known Shaw Brothers director at the time, specializing in period fi lms. Having 
already directed a large number of box-offi ce hits for the studio, Li felt he was not 
being suffi ciently rewarded for Love Eterne’s stupendous success. The rival Cathay 
Group saw its chance to lure Li away. However, since Li was still under contractual 
obligations with Shaw Brothers, he could not work directly for Cathay’s MP & GI 
studio without legal complications. Thus, Cathay, via Union in Taiwan, put up the 
funding for a major new studio based in Taiwan, and Goulian, or the Grand Motion 
Picture Studio, was born. Its head was Li Hanxiang himself.96
 The result was a fi lm company of a size never before seen in Taiwan. Although 
it only made twenty fi lms over a fi ve-year period, Grand single-handedly raised 
production standards to new levels, developed personnel, established a star system, 
helped build better distribution abroad and encouraged other companies to set up 
similar studio facilities. It also created several fi lm classics.97 Indeed, it might have 
been the beginning of a fi lm industry that could have overtaken Hong Kong’s, or 
at least been its equal. The chief fi nancial backer was the Malaysian Chinese Loke 
Wan-tho, head of MP & GI. Loke apparently had plans of investing US$5 million 
in the Taiwanese fi lm industry until he died in a plane crash which many have 
since claimed altered the course of Taiwanese fi lm history. Huang Zhuohan says: 
“If it were not for this crash, Taiwan’s Mandarin fi lmmaking would have entered a 
golden age and have risen to international standards. Instead, Hong Kong rose up 
alone …”98  
 Without its chief backer, Li was now left to his own devices and the Grand 
studio soon came to resemble United Artists in the 1920s, where the artists in 
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charge lacked fi nancial discipline. There is no better example of Li’s wastefulness 
than his 1965 production, The Beauty of Beauties, a historical costume picture of 
such extravagance that it took Li a year and three months to make, and devoured 
a NT$23 million budget. The numbers on this fi lm are staggering: 42 sets, 6000 
costumes, 30,000 props, 8,000 horses, 120,000 extras (provided by the military), 
334 working days, 800 chariots and 120,000 feet of fi lm stock. It was the local box-
offi ce champ of 1965, yet it only made back about NT$5 million in its fi rst run, since 
tickets were still quite cheap.99 The Grand Motion Picture Studio never recovered 
from this fi nancial blow. Still, a bona fi de private industry in Mandarin fi lmmaking 
was sparked by all this activity. Union, the distributor of fi lms from Grand, began 
producing fi lms itself, starting with King Hu’s Dragon Gate Inn.100 The coup of 
enticing King Hu to Taiwan would eventually result in his 1970 classic, Touch of 
Zen, the only Chinese-language fi lm to make a mark on the highest arenas of the 
international fi lm festival scene before the 1980s. 
 But nagging questions emerge: is this truly a chapter in Taiwanese fi lm history, 
or merely an extension of Hong Kong’s? The simple fact is that the private fi lm 
industry in Taiwan almost from the start became entangled with Hong Kong’s. 
Huang Zhuohan, for example, straddled both places throughout his career. He 
established The First Film Company (Diyi) in Hong Kong, but had the production 
wing set up in Taiwan to make swordplay fi lms starting in 1967.101 So intertwined 
were the fi nances, talent pools and political connections (even government-run 
studios engaged in numerous co-productions with Hong Kong companies), that it 
is often impossible to make a distinction between a truly “Hong Kong” fi lm and a 
truly “Taiwanese” fi lm during the 1960s and 70s. That all of them were classifi ed as 
guopian naturally did not help, and Western observers were confused, too.102 Even 
to this day Taiwan and Hong Kong do not see eye to eye on this issue. Every history 
of Taiwanese cinema in Taiwan will mention the made-in-Taiwan classics of this era 
— The Winter (1967), Touch of Zen (1970), and Four Moods (1970) — and speak 
of them as Taiwanese fi lms. At the same time, however, Stephen Teo’s history of 
Hong Kong cinema discusses all three fi lms as if they were Hong Kong productions, 
which is the common view there. Teo discusses Li Hanxiang, Loke and Grand as 
part of Hong Kong’s cinematic history as well.103 Touch of Zen, given its success at 
Cannes in 1975 with its special technical award, is particularly contentious.
 To fi nd truly “Taiwanese” fi lms distinctive from Hong Kong, we mostly have 
to look at the government-run studios which also changed dramatically during this 
same period. In 1963, Henry Kong was chosen from the GIO as the new head of the 
CMPC. Kong’s unexpectedly visionary tenure lasted nine and a half years, during 
which time he upgraded the studio’s management structures, production facilities 
and theatrical chains. As a result of these changes, the CMPC became one of the 
leaders in the Taiwanese fi lm industry. In 1963, Kong also saw a privately made, 
low-budget, half Mandarin, half Taiwanese-language fi lm, Our Neighbor, directed 
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by Li Xing. This inspired Gong to hire Li to direct a new type of policy fi lm which 
would be called “Healthy Realism.” The fi lms in this trend were not numerically 
signifi cant, but the three most signifi cant works — Oyster Girl (1963), Beautiful 
Duckling (1965) (fi gure 1) and The Road (1967) — obtained box-offi ce success on a 
scale no previous government-made fi lm had achieved.104 On the one hand, Healthy 
Realist fi lms continued the government’s propaganda needs: their tenor reminds one 
more of Soviet socialist realism than Italian neo-realism, which Kong claimed was 
the model. These fi lms were all shot only in Mandarin. They all presented a highly 
sanitized version of Taiwanese reality. Finally, they were heavily moralistic in tone, 
upholding traditional moral values while extolling government-led progress. Yet the 
Healthy Realist fi lms were quite different from the propaganda fi lms of the 1950s 
as they did deal with the common people in the countryside and their everyday 
concerns. There was a deeper implication to these fi lms as well. The indigenous 
development of Taiwan was now a worthy topic in government-inspired pictures. 
For the fi rst time, in other words, Mandarin fi lms acknowledged Taiwan — or at 
least an idealized version of Taiwan. No longer were they mere purveyors of shrill 
anti-communist diatribes with messages of retaking the mainland.
 With the CMPC, Grand and Union leading the way, the number of indigenously 
made Mandarin-language fi lms in Taiwan increased twenty-fold over the decade 
of the 1960s. In the year 1960, only fi ve Mandarin-language fi lms were made in 
Taiwan. In 1964, there were twenty-two. By 1969, there were eighty-nine. The 
year 1969 was also the fi rst year that their numbers surpassed the cheaply made 
counterparts in the Taiwanese dialect. By 1971, the numbers for Taiwanese-made 
Mandarin-language fi lms had exceeded a hundred. 
Figure 1 Images from Beautiful Duckling (1965) being screened 
outdoors in Hou’s Dust in the Wind (1986).
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 The rise of this fi lm industry in the 1960s became part of the informal 
education of Hou Hsiao-hsien, who largely grew up in that decade. Yet this was 
not the education one would expect of a director known for making some of the 
most challenging narrative fi lms in the world. Hou was not the most industrious 
student, often due to a lack of interest on his part. He did, however, educate himself 
in the available popular culture of the time. As Hou himself puts it, he rented and 
read every swordplay novel he could fi nd, and when he could fi nd no more, he 
read detective novels, popular adaptations of classic novels, translations of Western 
novels and even Qiong Yao novels when all else had been exhausted.105 (In A Time to 
Live, A Time to Die he is even seen reading racy material in the privacy of the family 
commode.) Hou also had a voracious appetite for fi lms early on, often sneaking into 
theaters (something seen in The Boys from Fengkuei), or gluing together old, torn 
ticket stubs found on the ground outside. He never saw as many fi lms as when he 
was in the military, however, since his particular tour of duty (as an MP) left Hou 
with a lot of free time, and he would sometimes see up to four fi lms in a single 
day.106 Once Hou was discharged from the military, he then went to the National 
Academy of the Arts to study fi lm. While attending the Art Academy in the late 
1960s, he received minimal technical training due to limited facilities. Directing 
classes were basically courses on theatrical directing and nothing more.107 But at 
least he saw more fi lms, although less than one would expect at a “fi lm school.” 
 Most of the fi lms Hou saw were either from Hollywood or Hong Kong. The 
only fi lm he has ever mentioned from this time was a British fi lm he saw while in 
the service around 1967, the name of which in English is uncertain.108 This obscure 
fi lm got Hou more seriously interested in cinema, but according to him, it did not 
help him understand the medium any better.109 When attending the Art Academy, 
Hou recalls his surprise when a teacher analyzed the visual motifs of a lesser work 
from Elia Kazan called The Arrangement.110 Thereafter, he says, he began to look 
at fi lms differently, but still not as what one would expect. He remained steeped in 
popular culture, and remained ignorant of cinema in its more artistic and cultural 
manifestations. Only when he was about to become a director himself in the late 
1970s did he fi nally begin to see more works from outside of Hollywood or Hong 
Kong. Once again, however, this was to minimal effect. When he saw Antonioni 
and other more experimental fi lms, he could not really appreciate any of them.111 
Hou even claims that he fell asleep while watching Fellini during his early days as 
a commercial director.112
 In truth, the real fi lm education of Hou was not an education, but an apprenticeship 
which began the day he joined the fi lm industry. Although it was not immediately 
evident, the best days of the commercial industry were already behind it by 1973, 
and a period of slow decline was already in progress. The signs were already there 
by the beginning of the 1970s with Grand no longer on the scene. Union would soon 
cease its production arm in 1974, leaving the CMPC as the only steady producer of 
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feature fi lms in Mandarin. Starting in 1973, Taiwan-based Mandarin fi lms slipped to 
between forty-fi ve and sixty-six per year until 1977, while Taiwanese dialect fi lms 
had disappeared altogether. Meanwhile, Hong Kong was still producing three times 
as many feature fi lms as Taiwan was.113 Taiwan discovered it could not match the 
budgets, quality and marketing of Hong Kong, especially now that Bruce Lee had 
come onto the scene. Furthermore, the ROC government once again had made it 
much cheaper for Hong Kong companies to acquire and process fi lm stock than it 
had for indigenous production companies.114 
 Generic classifi cations clarify this widening gulf. Hong Kong made many 
more actions fi lms than Taiwan (or anyone for that matter). In Taiwan these were 
considered more expensive to produce as well as morally dubious by conservative 
elites. Lu Feiyi notes how over a third of the fi lms made in Taiwan were instead 
classifi ed as wenyi pictures.115 Wenyi has been translated as “romance” or “literary 
fi lms,” and sometimes seems to include any kind of drama. Still, it is signifi cant 
that Taiwan made a large number of wenyi fi lms since they were much cheaper 
to produce than action pictures.116 Nobody better personifi ed this trend than the 
prolifi c director, Liu Jiachang, who made nearly thirty fi lms during the 1970s, 
including eight for the CMPC studio. Liu’s fi lms tended to be quickly and crudely 
shot, and very stereotypical in their characterizations. Yet he transformed the wenyi 
genre by including many musical numbers, making these fi lms even somewhat 
exportable.117
 Central to the Taiwanese commercial industry was a sub-category of wenyi 
fi lms that were known as simply “Qiong Yao fi lms,” named after the author of the 
romance novels on which most of these were based. The trend seems to have begun 
with two successful Li Xing fi lms made at the CMPC in the mid-1960s.118 By 1983, 
a total of forty-nine fi lms were based on a Qiong Yao novel, and there were several 
Qiong Yao clones as well. Qiong Yao even set up her own production company in 
1976, making, of course, only Qiong Yao fi lms.119 Easily exportable to markets such 
as Singapore or Malaysia, these fi lms are considered by many today grotesquely 
escapist. Healthy Realism made at least a failed attempt to deal with the realities 
of life in Taiwan; Qiong Yao fi lms made no attempt whatsoever. If these fi lms are 
to be believed, then everybody in Taiwan lived in spacious mountain retreats in 
Yangming Shan (a playground of the very rich in Taipei), everybody spent their time 
in Western-style living rooms, dining rooms and coffee shops, everybody aspired 
to be married in a Christian church, and everybody was so Westernized that the 
only trace of native culture was the occasional appearance of chopsticks, which in 
itself seems to be nothing more than an oversight by the continuity person. Brigitte 
Lin, who became a major star in Qiong Yao fi lms before she defected to Hong 
Kong, bluntly said that these fi lms were powerful precisely because they served as 
necessary illusions in a time when life was hard. In other words, they refl ected not 
the realities of Taiwan, but an alternate universe everybody desired to escape to.120 
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 Yet another factor increased the economic pressures faced by the Taiwanese 
fi lm industry over the 1970s. The diplomatic setbacks of the decade once more 
accented the importance of propaganda for the government. These political crises 
resulted in big-budgeted propaganda features sponsored by two successive heads of 
the CMPC during the decade, Mei Changling and Ming Ji. The father of Healthy 
Realism, Henry Kong, was replaced by a new head of the CMPC, Mei Changling. 
Mei promptly steered the party-run studio onto this path of expensive fi lm projects.121 
This included a wave of virulent anti-Japanese fi lms that came out after Japan broke 
ties with the ROC in 1972. The defi nitive work was Victory, released in 1975. This 
fi lm became number one at the box offi ce and won best picture at the Golden Horse 
Awards, Taiwan’s version of the Oscars. Its success was largely due to its open 
promotion by Chiang Ching-kuo himself.122 (In a sense this fi lm was Taiwan’s 
equivalent to the mainland’s The Red Detachment of Women.) Victory exemplifi es 
the government’s hope to tap into popular culture for political ends. Its director, the 
never-sleeping Liu Jiachang, brought his pop proclivities to the aid of government 
propaganda. The fi lm starred not only the godfather of Taiwanese policy fi lms, Ke 
Junxiong, but also a very young Sylvia Chang (Zhang Aijia). Liu’s main song “Mei 
Hua” (also the title of the fi lm in Chinese) became a major hit both in Taiwan and 
mainland China. The song could be sung at any time in the plot, most tellingly by 
a young Taiwanese boy who witnesses his father being harshly mistreated by the 
Japanese during World War II. “Chinese kids never cry,” the father — shackled, 
beaten, bloodied, patriotic — admonishes his son. “I’m sorry,” the tearful son replies. 
His father then suggests, ”Sorry? Then just sing!” By a miraculous glossolalia only 
possible under propagandistic expediency, the Taiwanese break out in song in 
perfect Mandarin, showing their undying aspiration to be Chinese by singing praises 
of China’s national fl ower. 
 This tendency towards big-budgeted propaganda fi lms reached its zenith after 
the loss of U.S. recognition and the Formosa Incident in late 1979. A number of 
fi lms refl ected fears of Taiwanese Independence, most of all a trio of fi lms called 
“searching for roots” (Xun gen). The 1979 example of this trend, The Source, spends 
most of its energy on a nineteenth-century attempt at oil exploration in Taiwan 
(combined with a few carefully interspersed shots of the bubbly, bosomy persona of 
the wife of a Texan who is helping them). Yet the key message is a fl ashback at the 
beginning when the protagonist as a young boy fi rst arrives in Taiwan: standing on 
the shore, he is reminded by his father that they came from China and they are there 
in Taiwan to help expand the frontiers of the great Chinese race. Other fi lms were 
clearly government responses to the loss of U.S. recognition. Li Xing got into the act 
with his star-studded Land of the Brave (1981), which he made at the CMPC studio. 
This has an opening documentary-like montage showing on-the-street reactions to 
the American withdrawal, culminating in a staged sequence where locals glare at a 
young curly-haired, blond male walking happily with two nubile local women. He 
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sees their reactions and pulls out a sign that says, in Chinese, “I am Australian!” The 
theme song of this fi lm, “We are Descendants of the Dragon,” became an offi cially 
sponsored rallying cry across the island, and once again, it was even popular in 
mainland China. The most notoriously expensive of these fi lms, however, was The 
Battle for the Republic of China (1981). This fi lm featured hyperbolic heroism, a 
large number of extras, some kung-fu by Ti Lung and a fi re at the climax that rivals 
the burning of Atlanta in Gone with the Wind. Most audiences saw fi lms such as this 
for free at public showings in schools or clubs; few, however, would think of paying 
to see them. As a result, such fi lms were now putting even the CMPC deep in the 
red. Moreover, some have argued that the anti-communist/anti-Japanese genres had 
exhausted themselves by this point, calling into question such exorbitant fi nancial 
outlays. From both a propagandistic and economic standpoint, such fi lms faced 
rapidly diminishing returns.123
 It seems strange, if not impossible, that this is where Hou really learned the 
craft of fi lmmaking. It is even more mind-boggling that the lessons Hou learned 
in this land of low-budgeted Qiong Yao fi lms, saccharine music, and hyperbolic 
and over-priced propaganda would have a lasting impact on his career, evidence of 
which is still visible in even his most recent fi lms. Yet this is the case.
 The long take is arguably the most defi nitive feature of Hou’s aesthetic. This 
is not, however, something he would have just learned from his early commercial 
days; rather, it is something he developed over time. The mean average shot length 
(ASL) for Taiwanese fi lms from this period shows some differences from elsewhere, 
but not signifi cant ones. The fi lms sampled from the 1960s average out to around 10 
seconds per shot. Using Barry Salt’s extensive analysis of ASL’s in other countries 
as a benchmark, Taiwanese fi lms during this period were generally cut slower than 
American fi lms, but were quite close to the mean in Europe.124 In the Taiwanese 
fi lms sampled from 1970 to 1977, the average shot length has come down to around 
8 seconds per shot, thus coinciding with a trend towards faster cutting lengths 
elsewhere.125 For the period 1978 to 1982, the ASL of the fi lms remained almost 
identical at exactly 8 seconds per shot. 
 These averages do seem to refl ect where directors fi rst learned their craft. Even 
when operating in Taiwan, the two famed Hong Kong émigrés into the Taiwanese 
industry — Li Hanxiang and King Hu — cut their fi lms more rapidly than their 
Taiwanese counterparts. For example, Li’s Beauty of Beauties comes in at 7 seconds 
per shot, while King Hu’s Touch of Zen is around 5 seconds. Li Hanxiang’s 1967 
classic, The Winter, is a dramatic fi lm in the vein of Taiwanese “Healthy Realism,” 
yet the mean shot length was under 7 seconds. Two of the most prominent Taiwanese 
directors, Li Xing and Bai Jingrui, tended to use longer takes on average. Two of 
Li’s works have an ASL of 12 seconds, seven are between 10 and 11.5 seconds, and 
four are between 9 and 10 seconds per shot. Bai Jingrui is even more consistent: of 
the six fi lms of his sampled, fi ve were between 9 to 10.5 seconds, and the only real 
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change was The Coldest Winter in Peking, which had an ASL of 11.5 seconds per 
shot. In 1970, all four of these directors collaborated to co-direct Four Moods in a 
last-ditch effort to revive the Grand Motion Picture Company. The longest ASL’s 
among these four chapters belonged to the two Taiwanese directors, with Bai leading 
the way with over 10 seconds, and Li Xing coming in second at around 8 seconds 
per shot. The chapters by King Hu and Li Hanxiang, on the other hand, both came 
in under 6 seconds per shot.
 This sampling from the 1960s to the early 1980s reveals an editing-based 
commercial cinema whose fi lms were cut just a little slower than Hollywood’s, 
and much slower than Hong Kong’s. The Taiwanese commercial fi lm industry 
was following worldwide trends in commercial fi lmmaking, yet always seemed to 
be “dragging its feet” in a sense. It was not a long-take cinema in search of its 
own style. It was instead a more functional editing practice based on economic 
expediency. Hou’s pursuit of the long take, then, results from his trying to overcome 
the strictures of this environment.
 Of course, Hou later distinguishes himself in other ways as well, and these 
were also affected by the negative lessons learned in this fi lm industry. In terms 
of lighting and shot composition, few have ever matched Hou in complexity and 
density, if not sheer beauty. This seems even more surprising considering Hou’s 
origins in the commercial fi lm industry in Taiwan. There, both lighting and shot 
composition betrayed a decidedly low-budget mentality. 
 In the heyday of the commercial fi lm industry, the lighting is remarkably 
uniform and functional, as opposed to expressive or artistic. These fi lms were 
shot in an anamorphic format on color fi lm stock, so a lot of light was needed, 
just as was the case for many Hollywood fi lms a decade before. Yet there was 
little effort to shape or sculpt the lighting, or to soften it. Certainly little was 
done to explore shadows and darkness as was being done at the same time by 
The Godfather’s Gordon Willis who has been called the “Prince of Darkness.” 
These fi lms would normally utilize fl at lighting with hard-edged shadows cast by 
actors and inanimate objects alike, resulting in harsh lighting designs overall. One 
example is The Ripening, from 1970. In one scene the female protagonist enters 
her bedroom and walks over to a corner. When she nears the corner, her body casts 
hard-edged shadows on both walls (fi gure 2). Not only is there no clear motivation 
for the two light sources coming from two directions, the clearly defi ned shadows 
also exemplify a hard lighting design with no diffusion used. Since lighting is so 
time-consuming to begin with, and little time was available for these low-budgeted 
fi lms, this comes as little surprise, especially since it was common in Hong Kong 
as well.
 To compensate, directors in Taiwan resorted to a set of visual gimmicks, some 
of which apparently have Hong Kong origins. Consider the overuse of quick zooms. 
A 1980 Taiwanese-made kung fu fi lm, The Orientation, features long stretches where 
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nearly every shot contains a quick zoom. Zooms are not unusual in kung fu fi lms, 
but zooms dominate Taiwanese non–martial arts fi lms as well, whether one of the 
so-called “student fi lms” by Lin Chingjie (i.e. A Student’s Love [1981]), a military 
propaganda fi lm (Teacher of Great Soldiers [1978]) or a dramatic love story such 
as Goodbye, My Love (1970, dir. Bai Jingrui). Often the purpose of these zooms is 
to punctuate key dramatic moments so that they cannot be missed by audiences. In 
Bai’s Love in a Cabin (1974), for example, a series of quick zooms is used on both a 
father fi gure and the female star (Zhen Zhen) at the very moment he implores her to 
not date his son any more. In general, one would be hard-pressed to fi nd a Taiwan-
made fi lm from this era that does not include at least a few quick zooms. Even 
Li Xing, known for his relative restraint, employs them for affective emphasis. In 
Beautiful Duckling, a rapid zoom-in occurs at the key moment an adopted daughter 
grabs her father and says she is still his real daughter. In Rhythm of the Wave (1974), 
a quick zoom leads to a fl ashback to emphasize a woman’s shameful past as a show 
girl. In Story of a Small Town, zooms stress a budding romance.
 Another visual gimmick, however, seems to distinguish the Taiwanese even 
from Hong Kong. The wide anamorphic formats meant a much shallower depth-of-
fi eld. Rather than avoiding this, Taiwanese directors often fl aunted this by including 
in the extreme foreground out-of-focus objects such as lamps, lights, vases, plants 
or tree branches. Sometimes these blurred objects would even partially obscure 
the view of the actor(s) in the mid-ground area. Examples of this practice are too 
numerous to count. A 1980 fi lm, Taipei, My Love, includes a banquet scene where the 
lights are made to streak to an extreme in order to emphasize the romantic ambience. 
In the same year, Love Comes from the Sea includes a dancing scene where lights 
Figure 2 Hard, unmotivated lighting on both walls in The Ripening 
(1970).
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in the extreme foreground are out of focus. Qiong Yao fi lms in particular display 
this tendency, most of all in the romantic scenes. In the 1977 Cloud of Romance, for 
example, Brigitte Lin fi rst declares her love for Chin Han in a coffee shop, with the 
foreground accented by the shining brass of table lamps, all blurred for a “romantic” 
effect. In Love in a Cabin this practice becomes “polymorphously perverse”: there 
are a plethora of objects ranging from neon lights, grates, fountains, candles and 
hanging beads, out of focus in the extreme foreground. A dance scene involving the 
star-crossed lovers in the namesake cabin features blurred-out candles in the extreme 
foreground that take up more space on the screen than the actors, nearly blocking 
the audience’s view of them (fi gure 3). The motivations for this widespread practice 
were also primarily economic: anamorphic formats resulted in wide compositions 
begging to be fi lled. Blurred objects in the foreground was a much cheaper and less 
time-consuming way to “beautify” or enhance the images than using expensive and 
time-consuming lighting of high quality, or more carefully wrought compositions 
and staging. 
Figure 3 Gimmicky, shallow depth of fi eld in Love in a Cabin (1974).
 One other practice, however, best exemplifi es what working in this industry 
meant for a director, one which in particular frustrated Hou. The Li Xing fi lm, The 
Heart with a Million Knots (1973), is Hou’s fi rst screen credit as he is listed as 
the continuity person. One scene illustrates a method of scene breakdown which 
epitomizes the Taiwanese fi lm industry at this time. This takes place in a dining 
room. During dinner, a live-in nurse tries to convince her elder patient that his son 
is very fi lial, not disobedient as he believes. Despite having twenty-one shots, and 
despite so many of them being tied up with shot/reverse shots, only seven shots 
are from a repeated camera set-up used earlier in this scene. Whenever a new shot 
is “wide” — meaning farther away and often showing multiple characters — it is 
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always from an entirely new angle than the previous wide shot, somewhere else 
around this same dinner table. 
 This is unlike Hollywood where it has been common practice to shoot a master 
shot of a scene. This entails shooting the scene in its entirety from a wide angle that 
captures all of the action. Often several takes of this master shot are completed to 
ensure there is always one good take to use. After a master shot is done, the camera 
is then moved to several other places for all the cut-ins, close-ups, reactions shots, 
detail shots and so forth, a practice commonly known as “coverage.” The key is that, 
no matter what other shots are used in the fi nal edit, there is always a master shot 
to fall back on which can be used for any re-establishing shot at any point in the 
scene. In Taiwan, however, there was never a master shot of an entire scene to begin 
with. For this reason, whenever there is a return to a wider shot, the crew could just 
as easily make it from a new camera set-up as from the original position since the 
two takes were being fi lmed independently in the fi rst place. This would ensure 
some visual variety in the fi nished product as well. Furthermore, the lighting was so 
uniform that there appears to have been little, if any, tweaking of the lighting from 
one camera set-up to the next as would be the case in Hollywood, where directors 
of photography are notorious for “cheating” for each particular placement. This, in 
effect, would make a Hollywood director less inclined to use more set-ups, but poses 
no hindrance to Taiwanese directors who were satisfi ed with purely functional, fl at 
lighting designs.
 Once again, this shows the impact that Hong Kong had on the Taiwanese fi lm 
industry. In Hong Kong they also did minimal tweaking of the lighting from shot to 
shot, and were just as apt to put the camera in just about every conceivable location 
in any one scene. David Bordwell has called this the “segment shooting” method of 
Hong Kong, where scenes are done from shot to shot from a variety of angles, and 
then edited together afterwards into a single scene without recourse to a master shot. 
The result is a wider variety of camera set-ups than is the norm in Hollywood where 
there is more of a tendency to return to the master shot during editing.126 Why Hong 
Kong shot differently from Hollywood is clear: this was the most effi cient way 
to create dynamic action scenes in a labor-intensive industry. In Taiwan, however, 
often this was being done for non-action scenes. Clearly demands for frugality with 
fi lm stock determined why there was no master shot: it was just too expensive. In 
Taiwan, every effort was made to keep the shooting ratios to a bare minimum. 4-
to-1 was considered extravagant, 3-to-1 to 2-to-1 was the norm. By the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, it was getting even lower yet. Hou himself was taught by another 
producer-director, Guo Qingjiang, how to get the shooting ratio under 2-to-1. He 
says that in one fi lm (which he did not specify) he was able to get 11,000 feet of 
stock for the fi nished fi lm out of a paltry 18,000 feet of exposed stock — a shooting 
ratio of 1.6-to-1.127 Indeed, the ideal in this industry would have been a perfect 1-to-
1 shooting ratio. What you would see is what they shot — and not a second more!
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 This ubiquitous modus operandi did not mean longer average shot lengths for 
these fi lms as one might expect. In the early 1980s, for example, three fi lms from 
Guo Qingjiang — according to Hou, the master of the low shooting ratio — had an 
ASL ranging from 5 to 7 seconds. However, given there was so little for the editor 
to work with, it is easy to see why these fi lms for the most part were quite stilted in 
their pacing, or rough around the edges. One could fi nd an occasional Taiwanese-
produced fi lm that was edited as quickly as early 1980s hits from Hong Kong like 
Aces Go Places (1982) and All the Wrong Clues (for the Right Solution) (1982), both 
of which average around 5 seconds per shot. But one cannot fi nd any Taiwanese 
counterparts that are edited quite as crisply and dynamically. This was simply 
because Taiwanese producers did not have the luxury to leave much of anything 
on the editing room fl oor since no fi lm stock could be wasted. It was precisely such 
hidebound methods which made Taiwanese-produced fi lms so vulnerable to Hong 
Kong by the early 1980s.
 What this meant for these fi lms went well beyond simply their rhythm or pacing. 
Having their best moments left on the editing room fl oor was the least of an actor’s 
concern in Taiwan. In fact, it was no small miracle if any of their best moments 
got recorded on fi lm in the fi rst place. According to Hou himself, who had ample 
experience with this practice, whenever closer shots were done for one character, 
the actor would not be talking to the other actor, but always to the clenched fi st of 
the assistant director standing in front of him or her.128 They never did a scene from 
beginning to end in a master shot; they only did this a shot at a time, with no real 
fl ow. Theoretically, what appeared in the fi nished product could very well be the 
only moments captured on fi lm to begin with, although inevitable mistakes still 
would bring the shooting ratio to higher than one-to-one. Stopping and starting, 
halting in mid-emotion and emoting to clenched fi sts all stopped performances cold. 
Even Li Xing rarely got memorable performances, which is not surprising given 
the shooting methods employed: the piecemeal practice of shooting one line at a 
time leaves a sense that his fi lms are but overwrought nodes of melodrama strung 
together on a perfunctory narrative chain. Perhaps as a means of disguising all this, 
Li Xing and others always had a steady supply of tears on hand. Beautiful Duckling 
ends with a young hooligan crying alone on the streets, realizing the error of his 
ways; The Road ends with a father full of tears of paternal pride for his fi lial and 
successful son. An archetypal ending in a Li Xing fi lm (The Sun Rises and Sets, He 
Never Gives Up, My Native Land) is a bawling family surrounding a dying father 
as he delivers the requisite last words in between measured last breaths. The facile 
recourse to tears was not made by Li alone. Perhaps no cinema anywhere has had so 
many fi lms end in a blubbering vale of tears.
 In 1973, Hou started as a continuity person, but soon became an assistant 
director, and fi nally a screenwriter, fi rst writing three works with his closest associate 
during the bulk of the 1970s, the director Lai Chengying. In Taiwan, directors rarely 
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did the actual directing; it was the assistant directors who actually faced the day-
to-day problems on the set, and they were in charge of keeping fi lm stock use to 
a bare minimum. Hou is listed as the assistant director for at least eleven fi lms 
in the 1970s, and that experience drove home for him the limitations of current 
fi lmmaking practices. All of these practices mentioned earlier — functional editing, 
functional lighting, compositional gimmicks, minimal shooting ratios, start and stop 
performances — Hou would one day reject, but not on day one, nor even on day 
ten. Indeed, for years Hou would bear some personal responsibility for perpetuating 
these practices. (It was his livelihood after all.) Yet as strange as it may seem, his 
experience with these practices would have a profound and lasting impact on him 
even after he would no longer rely on this industry for work. He would learn many 
things from this largely negative experience, but two invaluable lessons stand out: 
the importance of lighting and the importance of performance, two areas today that 
form the cornerstones of his own aesthetic.
 A key moment occurs when Hou scripted Li Xing’s Good Morning Taipei 
(1980). The cinematographer was Chen Kunhou. Thereafter Chen and Hou formed a 
directing/writing/cinematography team. In the years before joining the New Cinema 
(1980–1982), the pair completed seven fi lms together, with Chen offi cially directing 
four and Hou offi cially directing three (Cute Girl [1980], Cheerful Wind [1981] and 
The Green, Green Grass of Home [1982]). Hou was always the screenwriter, and 
Chen always the cinematographer, yet so close was their working relationship that 
critics at the time saw these fi lms as co-directed projects. Therefore, unlike most 
New Cinema directors, Hou and Chen brought with them a wealth of experience 
from the commercial fi lm industry. Chen and Hou shared ideas about reforming the 
production practices in the Taiwanese fi lm industry which led to their reputations 
as mavericks. Some of their reforms would eventually have a direct impact on the 
New Cinema, most of all their collaborative relationship. They were the fi rst to 
begin solving what they saw as inter-related problems: the paucity of fi lm stock and 
the staleness of performances. In their fi rst joint project, the Chen-directed Riding a 
Wave (1980), they reportedly used a “whopping” 35,000 feet of fi lm stock at a time 
when nobody would dare go over 30,000.129 For Hou’s The Green, Green Grass of 
Home, they used between 40,000 to 50,000 feet of fi lm stock, which was considered 
wasteful.130 In time, this quest for higher shooting ratios became a joint crusade 
among New Cinema directors. Hou and Chen, however, had already pushed the 
envelope before the New Cinema existed.
 Even the long take, which today most defi nes Hou, has direct links to his early 
experiences in the industry. Hou initially was not pursuing long takes as a conscious 
aesthetic strategy. They were a by-product of his quest for better performances. 
As an assistant director, Hou knew that existing practices needed to be changed. 
Nevertheless, he was bound to those methods in that position. Once he became a 
director himself, he began with the “novel” idea that a director should actually direct 
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on the set. Then he began to experiment with various ways of tweaking performances. 
Since neither Chen nor Hou had yet heard of any master-shot system, they found 
that performances in the existing segment-shooting method would be better served 
if each shot was longer to begin with. On occasion, relatively long takes seemed to 
Hou a practical way to give his actors more breathing room to perform. This was the 
very humble beginnings of one of the greatest long-take stylists in world history.
 The early fi lms bear this out. By the standards of the industry at the time, 
Chen was a long-take director, and Hou was even more so. For the twenty-fi ve 
fi lms sampled between 1980 and 1982, the average shot length comes out at 8.3 
seconds per shot. However, Chen’s 1982 fi lm Six Is Company averages 10.3 seconds 
per shot, while Hou’s Cute Girl is at 11.3 seconds, Cheerful Wind at 12.7 seconds 
and The Green, Green Grass of Home at 11.3 again.131 During this same three-year 
period, only Li Xing’s My Native Land and Bai Jingrui’s The Coldest Winter in 
Peking showed similar fi gures. 
 The style of these early works reveal the haphazard probes of a young director 
still searching for a new aesthetic within existing conditions. All three works were 
shot in the anamorphic format; all include a large number of zooms. In Cheerful 
Wind the two lovers (played by Kenny B and Feng Feifei) are out in a fi eld in a 
single take of two minutes in length: the shot begins as a long shot and then zooms 
out to an even more distanced shot to show terraced fi elds and mountains behind 
them. By contrast, a restaurant scene of the Feng Feifei character talking with her 
aunt in Cute Girl suggests things to come: also around two minutes in length, this 
time the camera does not move at all. These examples notwithstanding, Hou was 
not yet consciously pursuing a long-take aesthetic. According to him, he would 
still shoot from other angles, but when a particular take was good from a wider 
angle, he saw no reason to use other shots from other set-ups. This would gradually 
become a habit.132
 This quest for better performances did not just affect how Hou shot scenes, it 
eventually had an impact on how he scripted and structured his fi lms. After all, in 
his early days as a commercial director Hou still faced one nearly insurmountable 
obstacle: stars — or as Hou describes them, popular singers who could not act. 
These singer-actor wannabes were so image-conscious that Hou could do very little 
with them. 
 In his third commercial fi lm, The Green, Green Grass of Home, however, Hou 
would have a major breakthrough with the children who perform with ease and 
aplomb. The most notable moment is when a young boy gets upset at his father for 
killing his pet owl. The composition in this fi fty-fi ve-second shot is quite striking, 
using strong staging in depth, with the father in the foreground while the young boy 
moves diagonally in the distance, kicking vegetables and yelling in a convincing 
fi t of anger (fi gure 4). These child performances got Hou notice among critics for 
the fi rst time. One described this fi lm as a “warm tender depiction of the world of 
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children done in a quiet way to appeal to the emotions, making the fi lm refreshing 
and elegant and not at all following recent trends.”133 Hou says that he found it 
easy to direct children. He would never tell them when they made a mistake, but 
would always pretend that something was wrong with the lights, or that some crew 
member was at fault. (The crew members, in turn, all understood what Hou was after 
and would feign guilt.) The result was usually that the child actor would be even 
better on the second or third take.134 The most important development was not the 
notoriety, however, but a new modus operandi Hou has refi ned to the present day: 
improvisation. Hou would only tell these children the situation and would otherwise 
let them improvise the actual lines of dialogue, something he could never do with 
stars such as Kenny B or Feng Feifei.135 This method of directing, initially reserved 
only for children in The Green, Green Grass of Home, is today Hou’s method with 
every actor: Hou usually provides situations, moods and a sense of the atmosphere 
— but no precise lines of dialogue or strict blocking instructions.136
 Given their innovations within the commercial cinema, it is easy to see why 
Hou and Chen Kunhou would be such a good match for the budding New Cinema 
movement. The Green, Green Grass of Home would prove to be their ticket in. 
Zhan Hongzhi, who would become one of Hou’s closest collaborators, says that fi lm 
was one of the sources of the New Cinema because of its ground-breaking, free-
fl owing narrative.137 Edmond Wong claims that the success of this fi lm encouraged 
the CMPC to try its new low-budget/more-artistic-freedom approach with In Our 
Times.138 Before long, Hou and Chen would be called the “spiritual leaders” of 
the New Cinema.139 Within this movement, Hou would forge a whole new set of 
relationships, some of which remain crucial for him to this day. What is so shocking 
about Hou’s background is the dearth of outside infl uences, showing how thoroughly 
home-grown he is. Unlike other members of the New Cinema movement, he never 
went to a fi lm school abroad, and he was woefully ignorant of many trends in world 
Figure 4 Hou’s complex staging in depth in The Green, Green Grass of Home 
(1982).
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cinema, including those many mistakenly have thought infl uenced him. Nowhere 
is this more clear than in the early comparisons often made between Hou and Ozu: 
contrary to what was already commonly assumed, Hou claims that he did not even 
see an Ozu fi lm until after he had shot A Time to Live, A Time to Die.140 And yet Hou, 
not these Western-trained fi lmmakers, not even Edward Yang, would end up being 
the true center of the New Cinema. His fi lms would come to defi ne the movement. 
Ultimately, this is because Hou had one thing more than any other: experience in 
every sense of the term. He had not only fi rsthand experience with a Taiwan which 
was changing before his eyes; he also had that day-to-day experience in the grind 
of the Taiwanese fi lm industry. Together these gave birth to his illustrious career. 
Yet Hou could not do this without a lot of luck and help. He needed both friends 
and institutions to come to his aid. Fortunately, he became a director at just the right 
time: everything — Taiwanese society and Taiwanese cinema — would change 
even more dramatically in the 1980s. By the end of the decade both the man and the 
island were nothing like their 1980 selves. Sometimes timing is everything.
